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1. Introduction
Several economic and other areas depend heavily on the allocation of in-
divisible resources, objects or persons. A simple but deeply analyzed prob-
lem is that of matching, by making valuable pairs, the elements of two finite
sets. These are referred to hereafter as the agents’ sets. An assignment
matrix or array collects all these valuations.
There are at least two main issues to be addressed in any assignment
problem. Firstly we have to search/look and analyze how agents sort them-
selves out, that is, who is matched with whom. Secondly we have to solve
the assignment problem by proposing and studying fair allocations for the
agents. Both aspects have been dealt with extensively. Roth and Sotomayor
(1990) serves as an accurate well-written text at these issues and an up-to-
date survey is Nu´n˜ez and Rafels (2015).
Concurrent in time with the seminal paper of Shapley and Shubik (1972),
Becker (1973) shows up an original application of assignment problems to
the marriage market in which households produce some output to share
between man and woman. In some assignment problems he conveys the
effect of mating of the likes.
To model the mating of the likes he introduces two independent condi-
tions on the assignment matrix. First, the association of likes is optimal
when traits are complements and second, each trait has a monotone effect
on the output, higher values have a larger effect. Moreover he proposes
and analyzes the core of the game as a decisive reference solution set for
searching allocations to solve the assignment problem. In Becker’s paper no
explicit allocation is proposed.
In Chapter 10, Open questions and research directions, Roth and So-
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tomayor (1990) already expresses the aim of studying special classes of as-
signment problems “(...) of the kind explored by Becker (...)” (page 247).
Sherstyuk (1999) and Eriksson et al. (2000) manage to get insight into these
topics. Sherstyuk analyzes multilateral supermodular assignment games.
She proves the non-emptiness of the core and finds some extreme core allo-
cations a` la Shapley and Shubik. She imposes not only supermodularity but
also monotonicity and opens a question about the possibility of relaxing the
monotonicity condition, which we tackle in the last section of this paper.
Eriksson et al. (2000) formalize Becker’s ideas and introduce what is known
as Becker’s assortative assignment problems. Eriksson et al.(2000) discovers
how to compute the buyers-optimal and sellers-optimal core allocations in
the square case. They point out that all core payoffs rank the agents of any
one side in the same way.
Finally Schwarz and Yenmez (2011) shows the existence of a family of
central stable utility imputations for any assignment game. No formula is
given and they open the question to analyze these allocations as a pon-
deration of the extreme core allocations. In particular, they show that for
monotone supermodular production functions the fair allocation (Thomp-
son, 1981) coincides with their median stable utility solution.
The central purpose of this paper is to propose a new point solution
to solve any assortative, square or not, assignment problem. This solution
is named Becker’s solution. It outcrops after a reexamination of the core
of an assortative assignment game inspired by the seminal Becker’s paper.
Once defined and established an easy closed formula in terms of the original
entries of the assignment matrix, we devote our efforts to intertwine its main
properties.
Firstly we show that Becker’s solution always coincide with the median
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stable utility imputation introduced in Schwarz and Yenmez (2011). Sec-
ondly Becker’s solution always coincides with the nucleolus (Schmeidler,
1969) of the assortative assignment game. This is a pleasant result since the
nucleolus must be computed by tedious algorithms. Thirdly, we analyze the
core and obtain an easy method to compute all extreme core points, and its
number, a power of two.
To end the paper, we analyze which are the conditions for the Becker’s
solution to coincide with the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) and also some
extensions of the model to cover other assignment markets where our results
can be applied.
2. Preliminaries
A bilateral assignment market (F ,W, A) is formed by two non-empty
disjoint sets, the set of firms F = {f1, f2, . . . , fm} and the set of workers
W = {w1, w2, . . . , wn} where m could be different from n and a non-negative
matrix A = (aij)(fi,wj)∈F×W ∈ M
+
m×n where each entry aij represents some
measure of the joint productivity of firm fi and worker wj when they are
matched together. When m = n the assignment market is said to be square.
A matching µ from firms F to workers W is a bijection from F1 ⊆ F
to W1 ⊆ W, such that1 |F1| = |W1| = min {|F| , |W|}. The set of all
matchings is denoted byM (F ,W) . Similarly we useM (S, T ) to represent
all matchings from S ⊆ F to T ⊆ W.
We say firm fi and worker wj are matched by µ if wj = µ (fi) or fi =
µ−1 (wj) . In this case we also say that each one is the partner by µ of the
other one. With some abuse of notation we also write (fi, wj) ∈ µ. When
1|F | represents the cardinality of the set F.
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dealing with indices we also use j = µ (i) or i = µ−1 (j) , if no confusion
arises. When an agent does not have any partner by µ we say agent is
unmatched.
A matching µ ∈M (F ,W) is optimal for the assignment market (F ,W, A)
if for any other matching µ′ we have∑
(fi,wj)∈µ
aij ≥
∑
(fi,wj)∈µ′
aij .
The set of all optimal matchings is denoted by M∗A (F ,W) .
Shapley and Shubik (1972) associates any assignment market with a
cooperative game2, the assignment game, where the set of players is F ∪W
and the characteristic function wA is defined for any ∅ 6= S ⊆ F and
∅ 6= T ⊆ W,
wA (S ∪ T ) = max
µ∈M(S,T )
 ∑
(fi,wj)∈µ
aij
 ,
whereM(S, T ) is the set of matchings from S to T. Moreover wA(S∪T ) = 0
if either S = ∅ or T = ∅.
Notice that any pair of firm and worker evaluates its worth by exactly
the corresponding matrix entry, and any other coalition determines its worth
by pairwise combinations its members can form.
The agents of an assignment market may divide among themselves their
worth in any way they like. An imputation is a non-negative vector (x, y) ∈
Rm+ × Rn+ such that
∑m
i=1 xi +
∑n
j=1 yj = wA (F ∪W) , where we interpret
xi and yj as the payoffs associated to firm fi and worker wj respectively.
2In a cooperative game (N, v), the set of players is given by N = {1, . . . , n} and v is a
function that assigns a real number v(S) for any coalition S ⊆ N with v(∅) = 0. Its core
is defined as C(v) := {x ∈ Rn | ∑i∈N xi = v(N) and for all S ⊆ N, ∑i∈S xi ≥ v(S)}. A
game is named balanced if its core is nonempty.
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The core of the assignment game C (wA) is described for any fixed µ ∈
M∗A (F ,W) as those imputations (x, y) ∈ Rm+ × Rn+ satisfying
xi + yj ≥ aij for all (fi, wj) ∈ F ×W,
xi + yj = aij for all (fi, wj) ∈ µ.
Unassigned agents by µ receive a zero payoff in any core allocation.
Shapley and Shubik (1972) proves that the core of any assignment game
is always nonempty. Among the core allocations of an assignment game,
there are two specific extreme core points: the buyers-optimal core allocation
(xA, yA) where each buyer attains her maximum core payoff and each seller
his minimum, and the sellers-optimal core allocation (xA, yA) where each
seller attains his maximum core payoff and each buyer her minimum.
In Mart´ınez-de-Albe´niz et al. (2011) an alternative characterization of
the core is given. Let (F ,W, A) be a square assignment market. Then the
core is described as those imputations (x, y) ∈ Rm+ × Rm+ satisfying
xi + yj ≤ wA(F ∪W)−wA(F ∪W \{fi, wj}) for all (fi, wj) ∈ F ×W. (1)
Moreover, given two square assignment markets (F ,W, A) and (F ,W, B),
their cores coincide C(wA) = C(wB) if and only if
wA(F∪W\{fi, wj}) = wB(F∪W\{fi, wj}), for all (fi, wj) ∈ F×W. (2)
3. Assortative assignments. Extreme core allocations
Assortative assignment markets were introduced by Becker (1973). These
markets model special bilateral assignment problems where agents on each
side can be ordered by some trait with the consequence that the mating of
the likes or a positive assortative mating will form. Assortativity is modeled
7
by two monotonic effects with respect to the traits: the output effect and
the increment of output effect.
An assignment market (F ,W, A) is an assortative market if it satisfies:
a) supermodularity3 (the main diagonal is optimal in any 2× 2 submar-
ket):
ail + akj ≤ aij + akl for all 1 ≤ i < k ≤ m, and 1 ≤ j < l ≤ n. (3)
b) monotonicity (non-decreasing rows and columns):
aij ≤ akl for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k ≤ m, and 1 ≤ j ≤ l ≤ n. (4)
Matrix A is called assortative.
Only adjacent rows and adjacent columns are needed to check the su-
permodularity condition.
The class of assortative matrices is large enough. In fact, they form a
full-dimensional convex cone in M+m×n (see Eriksson et al., 2000).
Let (F ,W, A) be an assortative market with m ≤ n. From the supermod-
ularity condition at least one optimal matching µ ∈M (F ,W) is monotone,
i.e.
for all fi1 , fi2 ∈ F and wj1 = µ(fi1), wj2 = µ(fi2) if i1 < i2 then j1 < j2.
When the assortative assignment market is square, that is m = n, there
is only one monotone matching which is placed in the main diagonal i.e.
µ(fi) = wi for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. This is, by the previous observation, optimal
(maybe not unique).
3Notice that this condition implies that matrix entries as function of the indices is
supermodular in the lattice {1, . . . ,m} × {1, . . . , n} with the usual order. When the
reverse inequalities hold, it is called submodularity.
8
We will concentrate in the square case since any non-square assortative
matrix with m < n could be analyzed by adding null rows at the beginning of
the matrix. In this way we preserve supermodularity and the monotonicity
conditions.
Now we summarize some important and known results for any square
assortative assignment game (F ∪W, wA) with A ∈ M+m.
(a) The main diagonal of the assignment matrix A is an optimal matching
(maybe not unique).
(b) An allocation (x, y) ∈ Rm+ ×Rm+ belongs to the core C(wA) if and only
if
xi + yi = aii for all i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, (5)
xi + yi+1 ≥ ai i+1 for all i = 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1, (6)
xi+1 + yi ≥ ai+1 i for all i = 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1. (7)
(c) At any core allocation (x, y) ∈ C(wA) we have
0 ≤ x1 ≤ x2 ≤ . . . ≤ xm,
0 ≤ y1 ≤ y2 ≤ . . . ≤ ym.
Items (a) and (b) depend only on the supermodularity condition of the
assignment matrix, and a proof can be found in Mart´ınez-de-Albe´niz and
Rafels (2014). Item (c) depends only on the monotonicity and the fact
that we have an optimal matching in the main diagonal. It is known for
assortative matrices (see Eriksson et al., 2000).
Now we give a new and simple procedure to obtain all the extreme core
points. To this end, for notational convenience we introduce, for any square
assortative assignment market (F ,W, A) firm 0 and worker 0 and denote
a00 = a01 = a10 = 0.
9
A central path (a path) p is a sequence of different places or positions in
(F ∪ {0})× (W ∪ {0})
p =
(
(0, 0), (i1, j1), (1, 1), (i2, j2), (2, 2), . . . , (m− 1,m− 1), (im, jm), (m,m)
)
,
where (k − 1, k − 1) ≤ (ik, jk) ≤ (k, k), ik 6= jk, for k = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
Notice that for any central path p and any k = 1, 2, . . . ,m, either (k−1, k)
or (k, k−1) belongs to p but not both. Therefore there are 2m different paths.
The set of all paths is denoted by Pm.
A central path connects the initial position (0, 0) with the last one (m,m)
within the central strip. There are two important central paths, the one
through the upper part of the strip:
p∗ =
(
(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1), (1, 2), . . . , (m− 1,m− 1), (m− 1,m), (m,m)) (8)
and its symmetric path:
p∗ =
(
(0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 1), (2, 1), . . . , (m− 1,m− 1), (m,m− 1), (m,m)) (9)
For each path p ∈ Pm we associate an allocation vector, the p-vector
(xp, yp) ∈ Rm × Rm, by solving the linear equations given by all the places
of the selected path
xpk + y
p
k = ak k for k = 1, . . . ,m, and (10)
xpik + y
p
jk
= aik jk for k = 1, . . . ,m, (11)
where we take for notational convenience xp0 = y
p
0 = 0.
For each path p the above linear system has a unique solution, which
satisfies xpk ≥ 0 and ypk ≥ 0 for k = 1, . . . ,m, (xp, yp) ∈ C(wA), and in fact
it is an extreme core point. We prove it by induction over m.
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Firstly notice that if m = 1 there are only two different paths which
vector is either (a11, 0) or (0, a11). Assume that the solution is unique up to
k, k > 1, and without loss of generality assume path p contains (k, k + 1).
Then by (10) and (11) we have
xpk + y
p
k = ak k,
xpk + y
p
k+1 = ak k+1,
xpk+1 + y
p
k+1 = ak+1 k+1.
Simple manipulations yield, where we use the definition of assortative ma-
trix, see (3) and (4),
ypk+1 = y
p
k + [ak k+1 − ak k] ≥ ypk ≥ 0,
xpk+1 = x
p
k + [ak+1 k+1 − ak k+1] ≥ xpk ≥ 0,
xpk+1 + y
p
k = ak+1 k+1 + ak k − ak k+1 ≥ ak+1 k.
From here we obtain the uniqueness of the solution (xp, yp) and the fact
that (xp, yp) ∈ C(wA).
Moreover (xp, yp) is an extreme core point. To see it, just notice that if
it were the midpoint of two other core points, these points must satisfy with
equality all entries of path p. By uniqueness of the solution, they coincide
with (xp, yp).
We know that each central path gives an extreme core point. Let us
write Ext(C(wA)) the set of all extreme core points. We prove next that
any extreme core point is linked to a central path, that is, there is a cor-
respondence between paths and extreme core points. This is the following
theorem.
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Theorem 3.1. Let (F ,W, A) be a square assortative assignment market
with A ∈ M+m. Then
Ext(C(wA)) = {(xp, yp)}p∈Pm .
Proof. See Appendix.
From the previous theorem there are at most 2m different extreme core
points. As the reader may suspect, different paths can give the same extreme
core point. Therefore to analyze this issue we introduce some additional
notation.
Given an square assortative matrix A, we define its principal elements
dA1 = a11 ≥ 0, (12)
dAk = ak−1 k−1 + ak k − ak−1 k − ak k−1 ≥ 0 for k = 2, . . . ,m. (13)
Notice that each dAk , k = 2, . . . ,m, corresponds to a consecutive 2 × 2
submarket centered at the main diagonal. The number of extreme core
points is strongly related to the number of nonzero principal elements, nA,
that is
nA =
∣∣{k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} | dAk 6= 0}∣∣ .
Then we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2. Let (F ,W, A) be a square assortative assignment market
with A ∈ M+m. Then
|Ext(C(wA))| = 2nA .
The proof is a direct consequence of the next lemma.
In the next lemma we analyze what happens with the allocation associ-
ated to a path when we move one and only one of its positions. In this way
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we realize whether this change implies an actual change in the allocation.
This fact allows to count the number of extreme core points.
Lemma 3.1 (Switching lemma). Let (F ,W, A) be a square assortative as-
signment market with A ∈ M+m and let p ∈ Pm be a central path through
(ik∗ , jk∗) = (k
∗, k∗ − 1) for some k∗ ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Let p′ ∈ Pm be the same
path as p except we have switched (ik∗ , jk∗) position to (k
∗− 1, k∗). Then we
have
xp
′
k = x
p
k and y
p′
k = y
p
k for 1 ≤ k ≤ k∗ − 1,
xp
′
k = x
p
k + d
A
k∗ and y
p′
k = y
p
k − dAk∗ for k∗ ≤ k ≤ m,
(14)
where (xp, yp) and (xp
′
, yp
′
) are defined in (10) and (11), and dAk∗ in (12)
and (13).
Proof. We have to prove that the allocation defined in (14) satisfies equalities
of path p′. Since (xp, yp) is associated with path p, the only equality we have
to check is the corresponding to the position (k∗ − 1, k∗). Then for k∗ 6= 1,
xpk∗−1 + (y
p
k∗ − dAk∗) =
[
ak∗−1 k∗−1 − ypk∗−1
]
+
[
ak∗ k∗ − xpk∗
]− dAk∗ =
= ak∗−1 k∗ + ak∗ k∗−1 − ypk∗−1 − xpk∗ = ak∗−1 k∗ .
For k∗ = 1, recall yp1 = a11 and x
p
0 + (y
p
1 − dA1 ) = 0 = a01, finishing the
proof.
It rests to analyze the proof of Theorem 3.2. Notice that only when
in the switching lemma, Lemma 3.1, dAk∗ = 0 then the extreme core points
corresponding to p and p′ coincide. Therefore each time a principal element
vanishes, the initial potential number of 2m extremes is divided by 2, which
concludes the proof.
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This switching lemma indicates that whenever we raise up a path, firms’
sector is benefited, and consequently, workers’ sector is harmed. Recall
that dAk ≥ 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Clearly whenever a path is modified
downward, workers’ sector is benefited. Then as a direct consequence of the
switching lemma we have (xp
∗
, yp
∗
) = (xA, yA), where p∗ is the path given in
(8), and path given in (9) is the path for the workers-optimal core allocation,
i.e. (xp∗ , yp∗) = (xA, yA).
4. Becker’s solution
We want to show that a specific point solution has outstanding proper-
ties. We name it Becker’s solution for assortative assignment markets. We
define this solution and prove that it is a core point.
Definition 4.1. Let (F ,W, A) be a square assortative assignment market
with A ∈ M+m. Becker’s solution, denoted by B(A), is defined by B(A) =
(x∗, y∗) ∈ Rm+ × Rm+ where for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
x∗i =
1
2
aii +
1
2
i−1∑
k=1
ak+1 k − 1
2
i−1∑
k=1
ak k+1, (15)
y∗i =
1
2
aii − 1
2
i−1∑
k=1
ak+1 k +
1
2
i−1∑
k=1
ak k+1. (16)
We prove now that Becker’s solution is a core element, i.e. B(A) ∈
C(wA). To see that all components are non-negative, just observe that for
i = 1, . . . ,m− 1,
x∗i+1 − x∗i =
1
2
[ai+1 i+1 + ai+1 i − ai i+1 − ai i]
=
1
2
[ai+1 i+1 + ai i − ai+1 i − ai i+1] + [ai+1 i − ai i] ≥ 0,
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using the supermodularity and monotonicity of matrix A, see (3) and (4).
Moreover x∗1 =
1
2 a11 ≥ 0. We have proved
x∗m ≥ x∗m−1 ≥ · · · ≥ x∗2 ≥ x∗1 ≥ 0.
Similarly,
y∗m ≥ y∗m−1 ≥ · · · ≥ y∗2 ≥ y∗1 ≥ 0.
Trivially x∗i + y
∗
i = ai i for i = 1, . . . ,m. Finally, for i = 1, . . . ,m − 1, we
have x∗i + y
∗
i+1 ≥ ai i+1 and x∗i+1 + y∗i ≥ ai+1 i. We prove the first ones and
the others are proved similarly. For i = 1, . . . ,m− 1, we have
x∗i + y
∗
i+1 =
1
2
[ai+1 i+1 + ai i − ai+1 i − ai i+1] + ai i+1 ≥ ai i+1,
where we have used the supermodularity. Now using (5)–(7) we obtain
B(A) ∈ C(wA).
We prove next that Becker’s solution coincides with the median stable
utility solution introduced by Schwarz and Yenmez (2011) and also it co-
incides with the nucleolus of the assignment game. Therefore we provide a
nice formula for the nucleolus using only the matrix entries to compute it.
Schwarz and Yenmez (2011) define the median stable utility solution
for assignment markets in the following way. Let (F ,W, A) be an square
assignment market with A ∈ M+m. This solution is the unique core allocation
vmedian(A) = (x˜, y˜) such that, for all fi ∈ F and for all wj ∈ W,
λr({(x, y) ∈ C(wA) | xi ≥ x˜i}) = λr({(x, y) ∈ C(wA) | xi ≤ x˜i}),
λr({(x, y) ∈ C(wA) | yj ≥ y˜j}) = λr({(x, y) ∈ C(wA) | yj ≤ y˜j}).
Here λr is the Lebesgue measure in Rr, where r = dimC(wA), see Nu´n˜ez
and Rafels (2008).
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Theorem 4.1. Let (F ,W, A) be a square assortative assignment market
with A ∈ M+m. Then Becker’s solution B(A) and vmedian(A) coincide, i.e.
B(A) = vmedian(A).
Proof. See Appendix.
Now we turn to the nucleolus of the square assortative assignment game.
Among other solutions, the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) is a “fair” solu-
tion in the general context of cooperative games. For balanced games, it
is the unique core-selection that lexicographically minimizes the excesses4
arranged in a nondecreasing way.
Here, we use the characterization of the nucleolus of a square assignment
game of Llerena and Nu´n˜ez (2011). Given any square assignment game
(F ∪W, wA) and two arbitrary coalitions ∅ 6= S ⊆ F and ∅ 6= T ⊆ W, we
define
δAS,T (x, y) := min
i∈S,j∈W\T
{xi, xi + yj − aij} , (17)
δAT,S (x, y) := min
j∈T,i∈F\S
{yj , xi + yj − aij} , (18)
for any core allocation (x, y) ∈ C (wA).
Llerena and Nu´n˜ez (2011) prove that the nucleolus of a square assignment
game ν(wA) is characterized as the unique core allocation (x, y) ∈ C(wA)
such that for some optimal matching µ ∈M∗A (F ,W)
δAS,µ(S) (x, y) = δ
A
µ(S),S (x, y) , for any ∅ 6= S ⊆ F . (19)
4Given a coalition S ⊆ N, and an allocation x ∈ RN the excess of a coalition is defined
as e (S, x) := v (S)−∑i∈S xi. Note they can be considered as complaints.
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Now we are in the position to prove that Becker’s solution coincides with
the nucleolus of the assortative assignment game. Its rather technical proof
can be found in the Appendix.
Theorem 4.2. Let (F ,W, A) be a square assortative assignment market,
and (F∪W, wA) be its associated cooperative game. Then, Becker’s solution
coincides with the nucleolus of the game, i.e.
B(A) = ν(wA).
Proof. See Appendix.
5. Becker’s solution and the Shapley value
The most popular single point solution for cooperative games is the Shap-
ley value (Shapley, 1953). This solution assigns a vector for any cooperative
game, and it is based on marginalistic considerations. It can be regarded
as an ex-ante evaluation of the value (power) of any player in the game. It
is defined as the mean of all marginal worth vectors and a specific formula
can be derived. For any cooperative game (N, v) the Shapley value Sh(v)
is defined for all i ∈ N as
Shi(v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
s! (n− s− 1)!
n!
[ v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) ] , (20)
where |S| = s.
It is well-known that the Shapley value is usually outside the core for as-
signment games. Hoffmann and Sudho¨lter (2007) study the Shapley value for
assignment games and prove that for all exact assignment games the Shap-
ley value belongs to the core. They prove that this is a sufficient but not a
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necessary condition with a thorough study of 2× 2 assignment games. Ex-
act assignment games have been studied by Solymosi and Raghavan (2001),
where they derive two conditions: dominant diagonal and doubly-dominant
diagonal.
Now we investigate the relationship between the Shapley value and
Becker’s solution, and show that for square assortative assignment games,
both solutions coincide only for some specific assortative matrices. This is
our next theorem.
Theorem 5.1. Let (F ,W, A) be a square assortative assignment market,
and (F ∪W, wA) its associated cooperative game. The following statements
are equivalent:
1. Becker’s solution and the Shapley value coincide,
B(A) = Sh(wA).
2. The Shapley value belongs to the core, Sh(wA) ∈ C(wA).
3. Matrix A is as follows:
A =

α1 α1 . . . α1
α1 α2 . . . α2
...
...
. . .
...
α1 α2 · · · αm
 , with 0 ≤ α1 ≤ α2 ≤ . . . ≤ αm.
Proof. See Appendix.
Roughly speaking, this result shows that the Shapley value belongs to the
core of an assortative assignment game only when the dominant diagonal
property holds. Combined with the monotonicity, we obtain the special
structure of the matrix.
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6. Extensions
Now we introduce some extensions of the assortative market notion.
The first one contributes to relax the monotonicity condition (4). This
possibility was also pointed out in Sherstyuk (1999). We name this concept
weak-assortative and basically, apart from the supermodularity conditions,
we request the monotonicity only on the central strip of the matrix.
Given an assignment market (F ,W, A) where A ∈ M+m we say it is a
weak-assortative market if it satisfies supermodularity condition (3) and an
alternative condition to (4), that is
b’) central strip monotonicity (entries of the central strip satisfy mono-
tonicity):
aij ≤ akl for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k ≤ m, and 1 ≤ j ≤ l ≤ m, (21)
with |i− j| ≤ 1 and |k − l| ≤ 1.
As the name suggests, weak-assortative is a proper extension of the assor-
tative class of assignment markets. Nevertheless there is a kind of reverse
implication. The core of any weak-assortative market equals the core of an
assortative one. This is the essence to transfer the properties from assorta-
tive markets to weak-assortative ones. This result is constructive.
We introduce for any square matrix A ∈ M+m the matrix A˜ ∈ Mm defined
by:
a˜ij =

∑j−1
k=i ak k+1 −
∑j−1
k=i+1 akk for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m,
aii for 1 ≤ i = j ≤ m,∑i−1
k=j ak+1 k −
∑i−1
k=j+1 akk for 1 ≤ j < i ≤ m,
(22)
where the summation over an empty set of indices is zero. Notice that in
general, entries a˜ij may be negative, but if matrix A is weak-assortative,
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then A˜ ∈ M+m, since expression (22) can be written as:
a˜ij =

ai i+1 +
∑j−1
k=i+1[ak k+1 − akk] ≥ 0 for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m,
aii for 1 ≤ i = j ≤ m,
aj+1 j +
∑i−1
k=j+1[ak+1 k − akk] ≥ 0 for 1 ≤ j < i ≤ m.
(23)
Notice that matrices A and A˜ have the same central strip.
Theorem 6.1. Let (F ,W, A) be an square weak-assortative market with
A ∈ M+m. Then there exists an assortative market (F ,W, A˜) with A˜ ∈ M+m
given by (22) with the same core
C(wA) = C(wA˜).
Proof. See Appendix.
As a consequence of the above theorem, we can apply to any weak-
assortative matrix, directly from its central strip our previous results for
assortative matrices, that is, the extreme core points, Becker’s solution, and
its coincidence with the nucleolus5, etc.
Weak-assortative matrices open the possibility to look for a more general
class of assignment matrices that can be solved and their core described using
an appropriate assortative matrix. These matrices will be called assortative-
solvable.
Given an square assignment market (F ,W, A) where A ∈ M+m we say it
is assortative-solvable if there exists an square assortative matrix B ∈ M+m
with the same core, that is C(wA) = C(wB).
5Nu´n˜ez (2004) proves that for assignment games, equality of cores implies coincidence
of nucleolus.
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Weak-assortative matrices are assortative-solvable, but there are another
ones, as the next example shows.
Example 6.1. Consider the following square assignment market (F ,W, A)
with matrix
A =

21 25 27 5
26 30 2 0
7 41 52 60
8 2 53 73
 .
The assignment matrix A is not assortative, not even supermodular, not
even central strip monotone. An optimal matching is in boldface.
Matrix
B =

21 25 26 30
26 30 32 38
37 41 52 60
37 41.5 53 73

is assortative and defines the same core: C(wB) = C(wA). To see this equal-
ity of the cores, notice that wA(F ∪W) = wB(F ∪W) = 176 and check the
equalities in (2).
As an application we know that C(wA) has exactly 2
nB = 8 extreme core
allocations, the firms-optimal and workers-optimal core allocations are
(xA, yA) =(21, 26, 46, 59; 0, 4, 6, 14),
(xA, yA) =(0, 5, 16, 17; 21, 25, 36, 56).
The nucleolus of the assignment game (F ∪W, wA) is just the middle point
or the Becker’s solution applied to matrix B :
ν(wA) = ν(wB) = (10.5, 15.5, 31, 38; 10.5, 14.5, 21, 35).
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Notice that we have to use matrix B to obtain the extreme core allocations
or Becker’s solution. We cannot apply our methods directly to matrix A,
since the central strip changes from matrix A to the assortative matrix B.
Two natural questions arise. Firstly how to know whether matrix A ∈
M+m is assortative-solvable and secondly how to find an associated assortative
matrix. First of all, we fix an optimal matching on the main diagonal: the
optimal partner of firm fk ∈ F is worker wk ∈ W.
Given a matrix A ∈ M+m with an optimal matching placed on the main
diagonal, we introduce an auxiliary matrix H(A) = (hAij) ∈ M+m defined by
hAij = wA(F ∪W)− wA(F ∪W \ {fj , wi}), for i, j = 1, . . .m. (24)
Notice that in (24) we subtract the worth of the market without the partners
of firm fi and worker wj , that is, we drop out worker wi and firm fj . This
matrix is the cornerstone for our characterization.
In the above Example 6.1 we can compute matrix H(A) :
H(A) =

21 26 46 59
25 30 50 63
36 41 52 65
56 61 72 73
 .
Notice that matrix H(A) is submodular and monotonic6. This will be
our main result, since both properties for matrix H(A) characterize the
assortative-solvability of matrix A. Moreover, an assortative matrix B is
directly related to H(A) as next theorem shows.
6For the definition of submodular, see (3) but reversing the inequalities, and for mono-
tonicity see (4).
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Theorem 6.2. Let (F ,W, A) be a square assignment market where A ∈ M+m
and an optimal matching is placed on the main diagonal. Let matrix H(A)
be the matrix defined in (24). Then the following statements are equivalent:
1. Matrix A is assortative-solvable.
2. Matrix H(A) is submodular and monotonic.
Moreover, in this case, an assortative matrix B ∈ M+m with the same core is
given by bij = aii + ajj − hAij , for all (fi, wj) ∈ F ×W.
Proof. See Appendix.
Notice that in Example 6.1 matrix B given by Theorem 6.2 does not
coincide with the one in the example. This shows that an assortative-solvable
matrix does not determine the assortative matrix which corresponds to it.
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AppendixA. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof. One inclusion has been discussed previously. For the other, suppose
(x, y) is an extreme core point but it does not correspond to any path. Since
in any extreme core allocation either x1 = 0 or y1 = 0 (see Hamers et al.,
2002), then either x0 + y1 = a01 or x1 + y0 = a10 where x0 = y0 = 0 by
notational convenience. Let k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m− 1} be the first index where
xk + yk+1 > ak k+1 and xk+1 + yk > ak+1 k. Notice that xk+1 > 0 since if
xk+1 = 0 then xk = 0 and ak k = xk + yk = xk+1 + yk > ak+1 k contradicting
(4). Similarly yk+1 > 0.
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Now take ε ∈ R defined below
ε = min {xk+1, yk+1, xk+1 + yk − ak+1 k, xk + yk+1 − ak k+1} > 0,
and define (x′, y′) ∈ RF+ × RW+ by
x′t = xt and y
′
t = yt, for t ≤ k,
x′t = xt + ε and y
′
t = yt − ε, for t > k.
We have (x′, y′) ∈ C(wA) and (x′, y′) 6= (x, y). Indeed it is enough to see
that x′k + y
′
k+1 = xk + yk+1 − ε ≥ ak k+1.
Similarly define (x′′, y′′) ∈ RF+ × RW+ by
x′′t = xt and y
′′
t = yt, for t ≤ k,
x′′t = xt − ε and y′′t = yt + ε, for t > k.
Then (x′′, y′′) ∈ C(wA) and (x′′, y′′) 6= (x, y). Moreover (x, y) is the midpoint
between (x′, y′) and (x′′, y′′), a contradiction with (x, y) being an extreme
core point.
Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof. Consider p∗, p∗ ∈ Pm and denote (u, v) = 12
[
(xp
∗
, yp
∗
) + (xp∗ , yp∗)
]
.
In order to prove the theorem we only need to check that B(A) = (u, v),
since by Schwarz and Yenmez (2011) vmedian(A) = (u, v) for any square
assortative assignment market.
Clearly u1 = v1 =
1
2a11 and for k = 1, . . . ,m, we have uk + vk = akk.
Notice that for all k ∈ {2, . . . ,m} position (k− 1, k) belongs to path p∗ and
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position (k, k − 1) to path p∗. Then we have, for k = 2, . . . ,m.
uk−1 + vk =
1
2
[
(xp
∗
k−1 + x
p∗
k−1) + (y
p∗
k + y
p∗
k )
]
=
1
2
[
ak−1 k + x
p∗
k−1 + y
p∗
k
]
=
1
2
[ak−1 k + ak−1 k−1 + ak k − ak k−1]
= ak−1 k +
1
2
dAk .
Solving the above linear equations we easily obtain
ui =
1
2
[
aii +
i−1∑
k=1
ak+1 k −
i−1∑
k=1
ak k+1
]
for i = 1, . . . ,m,
vj =
1
2
[
ajj −
j−1∑
k=1
ak+1 k +
j−1∑
k=1
ak k+1
]
for j = 1, . . . ,m.
Proof of Theorem 4.2
Proof. We first prove some technical results that Becker’s solution B(A) =
(x∗, y∗) satisfies.
Notice first that for j = 2, . . . ,m,
x∗j − x∗j−1 =
1
2
[aj j + aj j−1 − aj−1 j − aj−1 j−1] . (A.1)
Lemma A.1 For all k ∈ {2, . . . ,m} we have
0 ≥ x∗1 − a1 k ≥ x∗2 − a2 k ≥ . . . ≥ x∗k−1 − ak−1 k, (A.2)
0 ≥ y∗1 − ak 1 ≥ y∗2 − ak 2 ≥ . . . ≥ y∗k−1 − ak k−1. (A.3)
For the first inequality of (A.2), just observe a1 k ≥ a1 1 ≥ 12 a1 1 = x∗1. For
the rest of inequalities let j ∈ {2, . . . , k−1} and because of supermodularity,
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notice j < k, we have
aj k − aj−1 k ≥ aj j−1 − aj−1 j−1,
aj k − aj−1 k ≥ aj j − aj−1 j .
Summing up and using (A.1) we get the desired result. Inequalities (A.3)
are left for the reader.
Lemma A.2 For all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1} we have
x∗m − amk ≥ x∗m−1 − am−1 k ≥ . . . ≥ x∗k+1 − ak+1 k, (A.4)
y∗m − akm ≥ y∗m−1 − akm−1 ≥ . . . ≥ y∗k+1 − ak k+1. (A.5)
To prove (A.4), let j ∈ {k+2, . . . ,m} and by supermodularity, notice j−1 >
k, we have
aj j − aj−1 j ≥ aj k − aj−1 k
aj j−1 − aj−1 j−1 ≥ aj k − aj−1 k.
Summing up and using (A.1) we get the desired result. The proof of (A.5)
is similar.
Finally and from the expression of Becker’s solution, is is easy to see
that for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1} we have
x∗k+1+y
∗
k−ak+1 k = x∗k+y∗k+1−ak k+1 =
1
2
[ak+1 k+1 + ak k − ak+1 k − ak k+1] .
(A.6)
Let fr ∈ F and denote R = {f1, . . . , fr} ⊆ F . Let AR be the matrix
A restricted to the first r rows and columns. Notice now that B(AR) =
(x∗R, y
∗
R) ∈ Rr+ × Rr+ is just the restriction of B(A), and that B(AR) ∈
C(wAR).
Now we prove B(A) is the nucleolus by induction over m. The case m = 1
is obvious. Assume the statement is true until r, r ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1} and we
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prove it for r + 1. Denote by R1 = {1, . . . , r + 1} ⊆ F and AR1 matrix A
restricted to the first r + 1 rows and columns.
Since matrix A is assortative, the main diagonal is an optimal matching
µ. Then S′ stands for µ(S) and we must check that
δAR1S,S′ (x
∗
R1, y
∗
R1) = δ
AR1
S′,S (x
∗
R1, y
∗
R1) , for any ∅ 6= S ⊆ R1. (A.7)
We proceed through cases.
Case 1: S ⊆ R,S 6= ∅.
δAR1S,S′ (x
∗
R1, y
∗
R1) = min
i∈S,j∈R1\S
{
x∗i , x
∗
i + y
∗
j − aij
}
=
min
i∈S
{
δARS,S′ (x
∗
R, y
∗
R) , x
∗
i + y
∗
r+1 − ai r+1
}
=
min
{
δARS,S′ (x
∗
R, y
∗
R) , x
∗
is + y
∗
r+1 − ais r+1
}
,
where is = max {i | i ∈ S} , and we have used (A.2) with k = r + 1.
In the same way we obtain
δAR1S′,S (x
∗
R1, y
∗
R1) = min
{
δARS′,S (x
∗
R, y
∗
R) , y
∗
is + x
∗
r+1 − ar+1 is
}
.
Now we have two possibilities:
(a) is = r. By induction hypothesis δ
AR
S,S′ (x
∗
R, y
∗
R) = δ
AR
S′,S (x
∗
R, y
∗
R) and by
(A.6) we have x∗r + y∗r+1− ar r+1 = y∗r + x∗r+1− ar+1 r and (A.7) holds.
(b) is < r. Then is+1 ≤ r, and by (A.5) taking k = is we have x∗is +y∗r+1−
ais r+1 ≥ x∗is + y∗is+1 − ais is+1. Now notice is ∈ S, is + 1 /∈ S, and then
x∗is + y
∗
r+1 − ais r+1 ≥ δARS,S′ (x∗R, y∗R) . In this case δAR1S,S′ (x∗R1, y∗R1) =
δARS,S′ (x
∗
R, y
∗
R) and similarly δ
AR1
S′,S (x
∗
R1, y
∗
R1) = δ
AR
S′,S (x
∗
R, y
∗
R) , and by
the induction hypothesis (A.7) holds.
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Case 2: S = {r + 1}.
δAR1S,S′ (x
∗
R1, y
∗
R1) = min
j∈R
{
x∗r+1, x
∗
r+1 + y
∗
j − ar+1 j
}
=
min
{
x∗r+1, x
∗
r+1 + y
∗
r − ar+1 r
}
=
x∗r+1 + y
∗
r − ar+1 r,
where we have used (A.3) taking k = r+1 and 0 ≥ y∗1−ar+11 ≥ y∗r −ar+1 r.
Similarly,
δAR1S′,S (x
∗
R1, y
∗
R1) = x
∗
r + y
∗
r+1 − ar r+1.
Then (A.7) holds by (A.6).
Lastly Case 3: S = S˜ ∪ {r + 1}, S˜ ⊆ R, S˜ 6= ∅.
δAR1S,S′ (x
∗
R1, y
∗
R1) = min
i∈S,j∈R1\S
{
x∗i , x
∗
i + y
∗
j − aij
}
=
min
j∈R\S˜
{
δAR
S˜,S˜′
(x∗R, y
∗
R) , x
∗
r+1, x
∗
r+1 + y
∗
j − ar+1 j
}
=
min
{
δAR
S˜,S˜′
(x∗R, y
∗
R) , x
∗
r+1 + y
∗
jt − ar+1 jt
}
,
where we have noticed first that R1 \ S = R \ S˜; we have x∗r+1 ≥ x∗r ≥
δAR
S˜,S˜′
(x∗R, y
∗
R) and we have used (A.3) with k = r+1 and jt = max
{
j | j ∈ R \ S˜
}
.
In the same way we obtain
δAR1S′,S (x
∗
R1, y
∗
R1) = min
{
δAR
S˜′,S˜
(x∗R, y
∗
R) , y
∗
r+1 + x
∗
jt − ajt r+1
}
.
Now we have two possibilities:
(a) jt = r. By induction hypothesis δ
AR
S˜,S˜′
(x∗R, y
∗
R) = δ
AR
S˜′,S˜
(x∗R, y
∗
R) and by
(A.6) we have x∗r + y∗r+1− ar r+1 = y∗r + x∗r+1− ar+1 r and (A.7) holds.
(b) jt < r. Then jt + 1 ≤ r, and by (A.4) taking k = jt we have x∗r+1 +
y∗jt − ar+1 jt ≥ x∗jt+1 + y∗jt − ajt+1 jt . Now notice jt ∈ R \ S˜, jt +
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1 /∈ R \ S˜, and then x∗r+1 + y∗jt − ar+1 jt ≥ δARS˜,S˜′ (x
∗
R, y
∗
R) . In this
case δAR1S,S′ (x
∗
R1, y
∗
R1) = δ
AR
S˜,S˜′
(x∗R, y
∗
R) and similarly δ
AR1
S′,S (x
∗
R1, y
∗
R1) =
δAR
S˜′,S˜
(x∗R, y
∗
R) . Then (A.7) holds.
This finishes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 5.1
Proof. 1. −→ 2. Immediate.
2. −→ 3. First, let (F ∪W, wA) be an square assignment game with A ∈
M+m. Now we relate the Shapley value of this assignment game with the Shap-
ley value of the game when we add the same constant to all matrix entries.
This constant can be positive or negative, provided we stay into M+m. Then,
from Hoffmann and Sudho¨lter (2007), for any t ≥ −min(fi,wj)∈F×W{aij}
define matrix At by atij = aij + t, that is A
t = A+ tU with matrix U ∈ M+m
a matrix of ones. Now we have
Shi(wAt) =
t
2
+ Shi(wA), for all fi ∈ F , (A.8)
Shj(wAt) =
t
2
+ Shj(wA), for all wj ∈ W. (A.9)
Notice that if A is assortative then min(fi,wj)∈F×W{aij} = a11. Take now
t1 = −a11. Matrix At1 is assortative and since Sh(wA) ∈ C(wA), clearly
Sh(wAt1 ) ∈ C(wAt1 ). Therefore since at111 = 0, then Sh1(wAt1 ) = 0, for
f1 ∈ F . As a consequence of (20), at11 j = 0, for j = 2, . . . ,m. Similarly,
taking w1 ∈ W we can obtain at1i 1 = 0, for i = 2, . . . ,m. Then, we have
proved that ai 1 = a11 for i = 2, . . . ,m, and a1 j = a11 for j = 2, . . . ,m.
Now players f1 ∈ F and w1 ∈ W are null players in (F ∪W, wAt1 ) since
at1i j = 0, for i = 1 or j = 1, and can be thrown out. Notice that the Shapley
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value and the core satisfy the strong null property7. Proceed in the same
way and the result is achieved.
3. −→ 1. It is a simple computation taking into account (A.8).
Proof of Theorem 6.1
Proof. We show that matrix A˜ given by (22) is assortative and C(wA) =
C(w
A˜
). First notice that for any i, j such that |i− j| ≤ 1 we have a˜ij = aij ,
that is, the central strip is the same in both matrices. It is easy to see that
a˜ij + a˜i+1 j+1 = a˜i j+1 + a˜i+1 j for |i − j| ≥ 1. From here we conclude that
the market (F ,W, A˜) is supermodular.
We only have to show that a˜ij ≤ a˜kl for 1 ≤ i ≤ k ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ l ≤
m, or equivalently
a˜ij ≤ a˜i+1 j for 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1 and 1 ≤ j ≤ m, and (A.10)
a˜ij ≤ a˜i j+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1. (A.11)
We concentrate on (A.11) and the other case (A.10) is proved similarly.
Fix i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} and we distinguish three cases: (a) 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m− 1,
(b) i = j or i = j + 1 and (c) 1 ≤ j + 1 < i ≤ m. Cases (a) and (c) come
from (22) and the weak-assortative hypothesis on matrix A. The case (b) is
immediate.
Since both matrices A, A˜ are supermodular with the same central strip,
the equality of the cores follows, see the description of the core for super-
modular matrices (5) – (7).
7A solution satisfies the strong null player property if any element of the solution to a
game assigns zero to any null player of the game and the solution to a game (N ∪ {i}, v′)
that arises from (N, v) by adding the null player i arises from the solution to (N, v) by
adding a zero coordinate for the null player i to any element of the solution to (N, v).
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Proof of Theorem 6.2
Proof. 1. −→ 2. Since A is assortative-solvable, there exists an assortative
matrix B ∈ M+m such that C(wA) = C(wB). From here, since matrix A has
an optimal matching in the main diagonal, it is clear that the main diagonal
is also an optimal matching for matrix B and bkk = akk for k = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
We can assume, maybe by applying Theorem 6.1, that the entries of matrix
B are given by (22). Now we claim, for all (fi, wj) ∈ F ×W,
bij = bii + bjj − wB(F ∪W) + wB(F ∪W \ {fj , wi}). (A.12)
Trivially (A.12) holds for 1 ≤ i = j ≤ m. We discuss one case and the other
case is proved similarly. For 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m,
bij =
j−1∑
k=i
bk k+1 −
j−1∑
k=i+1
bkk,
=
j−1∑
k=i
bk k+1 +
i−1∑
k=1
bkk +
m∑
k=j+1
bkk + bii + bjj −
m∑
k=1
bkk
= bii + bjj − wB(F ∪W) + wB(F ∪W \ {fj , wi}).
Notice that to compute the last equality, matrix without row j and column
i is a square assortative matrix and an optimal matching is placed in its
main diagonal.
Expression (A.12) can be written as
hBij = bii + bjj − bij , for all (fi, wj) ∈ F ×W. (A.13)
Moreover, by (2) it is easy to see H(A) = H(B).
Now since B is supermodular it is immediate, see (A.13), that matrix
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H(B) is submodular. To see monotonicity of matrix H(B) we show
hBij ≤ hBi+1 j for 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1 and 1 ≤ j ≤ m, and (A.14)
hBij ≤ hBi j+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1. (A.15)
We prove (A.15) and (A.14) is proved similarly. Fix i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}
and we distinguish three cases: (a) for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m − 1 we have hBij =
bii+ bjj− bij ≤ bii+ bj j+1− bi j+1 ≤ bii+ bj+1 j+1− bi j+1 = hBi j+1, where the
first inequality comes from supermodularity and the second by monotonicity
of matrix B; (b) for i = j or i = j + 1 just use the monotonicity of B; and
(c) for 1 ≤ j+1 < i ≤ m we use expression (22) to write bij =
∑i−1
k=j bk+1 k−∑i−1
k=j+1 bkk and bi j+1 =
∑i−1
k=j+1 bk+1 k−
∑i−1
k=j+2 bkk. Therefore h
B
i j+1−hBij =
(bii + bj+1 j+1 − bi j+1)− (bii + bjj − bij) = bj+1 j − bjj ≥ 0.
2. −→ 1. Define matrix B by
bij = aii + ajj − hAij for all (fi, wj) ∈ F ×W. (A.16)
Notice first that for k = 1, 2, . . . ,m, hAkk = akk and then bkk = akk. We
prove that matrix B is assortative and C(wA) = C(wB).
First we prove the equality C(wA) = C(wB). Let it be (x, y) ∈ C(wA).
We have, for all (fi, wj) ∈ F ×W,
xi + yj = (aii − yi) + (ajj − xj) = aii + ajj − (xj + yi)
≥ aii + ajj − wA(F ∪W) + wA(F ∪W \ {fj , wi}) = bij ,
where we have used the expression of the core in (1). As a consequence, we
have for all matching µ′ ∈M (F ,W)
m∑
k=1
bkk =
m∑
k=1
akk =
m∑
k=1
xk + yk =
∑
(fi,wj)∈µ′
xi + yj ≥
∑
(fi,wj)∈µ′
bij ,
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which proves that the main diagonal µ = {(1, 1), (2, 2), . . . (m,m)} is also
an optimal matching for matrix B. Therefore we have proved that C(wA) ⊆
C(wB).
To see the reverse inclusion, let it be any (x, y) ∈ C(wB). Then for all
(fi, wj) ∈ F ×W, we have xi + yj ≥ bij and using (A.16) we obtain
xj + yi = (ajj − yj) + (aii − xi) ≤ aii + ajj − bij = hAij .
Now taking into account that wA(F ∪W) = wB(F ∪W) and the expression
of the core in (1), we obtain (x, y) ∈ C(wA) finishing the proof. Notice that
from (2) we have the equality hAij = h
B
ij for all (fi, wj) ∈ F ×W.
Now we prove that matrix B is assortative. Since by hypothesis matrix
H(A) is submodular it is immediate from (A.16) that matrix B is super-
modular. To see the monotonicity of matrix B we show
bij ≤ bi+1 j for 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1 and 1 ≤ j ≤ m, and (A.17)
bij ≤ bi j+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1. (A.18)
We prove (A.18) and leave the proof of (A.17) to the reader.
Fix i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} and we distinguish three cases: (a) for 1 ≤ i < j ≤
m− 1; (b) for 1 ≤ i = j ≤ m− 1; and (c) for 1 ≤ j < i ≤ m.
Case (a): 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m− 1.
Notice that for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m we have
hBij = wB(F ∪W)− wB(F ∪W \ {fj , wi})
=
m∑
k=1
bkk −
 i−1∑
k=1
bkk +
j−1∑
k=i
bk k+1 +
m∑
k=j+1
bkk
 = j∑
k=i
bkk −
j−1∑
k=i
bk k+1,
where we have used the supermodularity of matrix B and the fact that in
the square submarket associated to coalition F ∪ W \ {fj , wi} there is an
optimal matching on its main diagonal.
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As a consequence, for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m − 1 a simple computation using
(A.16) yields
bi j+1 − bij = bj+1 j+1 − bjj + hBij − hBi j+1
= bj+1 j+1 − bjj + bj j+1 − bj+1 j+1
= bj j+1 − bjj
= ajj + aj+1 j+1 − hAj j+1 − ajj = hAj+1 j+1 − hAj j+1 ≥ 0,
by the monotonicity of matrix H(A).
Case (b) for 1 ≤ i = j ≤ m − 1 is immediate and case (c) for 1 ≤ j <
i ≤ m is proved similarly to case (a).
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